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Under the law, Child Support Enforcement services are supposed to
be available to all single-headed families with absent parents who are
not paying support, or not paying enough support. Using Alabama as
a case study, it was determined that factors operating at the agency
level effectively control how many non-public assistance clients are being
served. The number of non-AFDC clients was found to be a function of
the number of AFDC clients rather than a function of the free-market
of services. It is proposed that the incentive structure for collections,
which limits incentive payments for non-AFDC to 115 percent of AFDC
collections, is a key factor. Methods of advertising, or marketing of
services to non-AFDC populations may be used as tool to control access
to information regarding agency services.
Introduction
Child Support Enforcement (CSE) services for non-welfare
families have been a part of the CSE program since 1975 with
the passage of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Despite the
inclusion of non-welfare families, services were not, generally,
provided to this population (Lima & Harris, 1988). These ser-
vices were reaffirmed by the Child Support Amendments of
1984 which clearly established that child support obligations
were not to be confined to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) cases (Stuart 1986, p. 204). The Family Support
Act of 1988 again confirmed this obligation.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Dr. Hugo Varela for his assistance
with the data analysis and Rose Marie Childress, Child Support Enforcement
office director, for her professional insight.
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Non-payment of child support has become one of the most
pervasive of social problems (Dobelstein, 1990), affecting not
only families in poverty but middle and upper-middle class
families as well. However, most CSE services are directed at
collecting from fathers of welfare clients (Cassetty, 1978; Kahn
& Kammerman, 1988; Congressional Research Service, 1989;
Miller, 1990). States, in an attempt to control welfare costs, seek
to recover welfare expeditures from the responsible father and
establish him, rather than the state as the financial provider.
This research focuses on CSE services to non-welfare families.
As CSE agencies have become a vital resource to families in
securing child support from non-paying parents, assuring these
services are provided to non-welfare clients is just as important
as assuring services are provided to welfare clients.
Non-Payment of Child Support as a Social Problem
Financial support of one's children is a legal responsibility
(Krause, 1983). However, without a support order and other
enforcement measures, such as wage withholding, the absent
parent often does not provide for the children concerned (Con-
gressional Research Service [CRS], 1989). The Child Support
Enforcement office is by law, supposed to provide services to all
qualified clients seeking help in securing past due child support
payments. Dobelstein (1990) estimates that there are perhaps 4
million families who qualify to participate in the Child Support
Enforcement (CSE) program but do not. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Census (1989):
-of the 8.8 million female-headed households, 5.4 million were
awarded child support.
-of the 3.4 million women without child support awards, about
half wanted awards but could not obtain them.
-seventy-four percent of the women who were supposed to
receive payments received some payment, leaving twenty-five
percent of female-headed families without any support.
-for those women who received payments irregularly or not at
all, the main reason reported was the refusal of the father to pay
(p.3).
Child Support Enforcement legislation can be seen as a re-
sponse to the growing concern with the growth in the number of
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female-headed families. From 1970 to 1988, there has been a 119
percent increase in this family type, where it is estimated that
7.4 million families are female-headed (Committee on Ways and
Means, 1990). According to Duncan and Hoffman (1988), 75 per-
cent of all welfare spells begin following a divorce, separation or
out of wedlock birth; the longest term welfare recipients being
nonwhite children born out of wedlock. However, just because
a child support order is established, it does not mean the father
pays. For example, the Nichols-Casebolt and Klawitter (1990)
study of paternity adjudications for establishing support did
not find a reduction in welfare use even though a child support
order was established. While it is known that many women,
who either through divorce, separation or illegitimate births,
experience drastic income drops because of child responsibility
(the poverty rate in 1989 for all women with children from
absent fathers was 32 percent, and the poverty rate for never-
married women was 53.9 percent [U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1991]), does not necessarily indicate a cause and effect rela-
tionship between income deprivation and welfare use. In fact,
81 percent of the mothers, who were owed child support but
received none, did not become Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) recipients (CRS 1989, p. 7).
The Federal Incentive Formula and Non-Welfare Families
The failure of the OCSE to provide needed services to non-
welfare clients can be attributed, in part, to the lack of federal
incentives for serving this population. It was not until the 1984
Child Support Amendments that agencies were assured that
they would be reimbursed for administrative costs for supply-
ing services to non-AFDC clients. As of 1985, the Federal OCSE
began to pay 66 percent of agency program costs and mainte-
nance (CRS, 1989, p.67). In addition, an incentive payment for
collections was also implemented.
States actually stand to make a profit from child support
collections from AFDC clients through this incentive formula.
Each State receives an incentive payment equal to at least six
percent and a maximum of ten percent of the State's total
amount of AFDC and its non-AFDC support collections. How-
ever, the federal program, worried that agencies would shift
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collection efforts to the non-AFDC population, placed a limit
on the incentive payment for non-AFDC collections, capped
at a maximum of 115 percent of incentive payment for AFDC
collections (CRS, 1989, pp. 61-2). Thus agencies are precluded
from a financial advantage for serving non-welfare clients.
Overall, collections from non-welfare clients are higher than
welfare clients, 16 percent more (Kahn & Kammerman 1988,
p. 13). For example, for the state of Alabama, 1985-1989 (see
Table 1), in 1985 non-AFDC collections represented 92 percent of
AFDC collections ($109,496-AFDC, $100,783-non-AFDC). How-
ever, by 1989, non-AFDC collections represented 284 percent of
AFDC collections ($140,558-AFDC; $399,463-non-AFDC).
Nationally, collections have increased substantially for both
welfare and non-welfare clients. According to Stuart (1986, p.
203), total collections amounted to $1.6 billion in 1981 with
nonpublic assistance collections representing 58 percent of col-
lections and AFDC representing 42 percent. In 1987 the U. S.
Department of Health and Human Services (1987) report that
AFDC collections grew by 54 percent from 1983-1987, and non-
AFDC collection rose 122 percent (p.2 ). In addition, non-AFDC
collections are cost effective (dollars spent by the agency to
collect child support are less than dollars collected) whereas
cost for AFDC collections continue to rise (p.7).
Table 1
Child Support Collections for AFDC and non-AFDC 1985-1989, State
of Alabama
Percentage
Year AFDC non-AFDC AFDC/non-AFDC
1985 109,496 100,783 92%
1986 112,970 157,339 114%
1987 134,040 218,527 163%
1988 156,741 369,938 236%
1989 140,558 399,463 284%
Source: Child Support Enforcement Division. Montgomery, AL.
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It is expected that both the 1984 "get tough" enforcement
measures as well as the incentives for collections would greatly
influence the number of AFDC clients and non-public assistance
clients. This expectation is demonstrated in the caseload num-
bers for the state of Alabama (see Figure 1). Within one year,
by 1985, agencies responded dramatically to federal legislation
as demonstrated by increased caseloads for both populations.
Clients and Services
Welfare clients are mandated to participate in the child sup-
port enforcement program if they want to continue receiving
AFDC benefits. Participation of non-welfare clients is a func-
tion of the free market of services,, based on client initiative.
Typically CSE agencies advertise their services to the public via
public services announcements on the television and radio, or
through posters placed on bulletin boards in Veterans Adminis-
tration and Social Security buildings. It is then up to the client to
come into the agency. Therefore awareness plays a crucial role
for obtaining the services. It is expected that as more women
who are not receiving child support and not on welfare find
out about the program, client numbers would increase. How-
ever, as was demonstrated with the dramatic increase in client
use in 1985, agencies, acting on decisions made at the Federal
level, most likely play a significant role in whether clients are
encouraged to take advantage of OCSE services.
A number of studies have been conducted which address
maximizing child support payments. Such studies focus on de-
termining optimal income transfers (e.g., Oellerich, Garfinkel
and Robins, 1991). Other studies attempt to determine why
fathers do not pay (Chambers, 1979; Weitzman, 1988). These
studies assume client use of CSE services but are not concerned
with how or why the client seeks the services of the CSE office in
the first place. Non-payment of child support cannot be tackled
by the CSE agency unless the mother seeks the services of the
CSE office. Thus, knowledge of availability of services can play
a key role in getting mothers into the OCSE office. In such
cases, optimizing income transfers is a moot point; the custodial
parent in need of support needs to be in the system before any
strategies can be effected.
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The thesis proposed here is that child support collections/
payments could be substantially increased but that increase
would depend on more non-public assistance clients seeking
and being provided CSE services. Thus it is proposed that
numbers of nonwelfare clients should be a function of the free-
market of services, provided by CSE agencies. The alternative
is that the number of clients is not a function of the free-market
of services, and that something is controlling access to CSE
services.
Data And Analysis
The relationship between non-welfare case loads and AFDC
case loads is examined for all counties (N=67) 1 in the state of
Alabama. The data for this project are collected from quarterly
reports (ending in September) from the State of Alabama De-
partment of Human Resources for seven years from 1984 to 1990
(State Department of Human Resources Managerial Analysis
Unit). There is no significance in the choice of the quarter other
than this quarter was the period when data was available for all
years. The data consist of the number of cases of AFDC clients
and nonwelfare clients for each year, for each county. Data per-
taining to child support collections were obtained from the State
of Alabama Department of Child Support Enforcement (Mont-
gomery, AL). Because the data are from the state of Alabama
they may not be representative of other states, however as a
case study, they provide insight into the relationship between
federal policy and state response.
Summary statistics as well as several other statistical proce-
dures were used to analyze the data to determine if the number
of client cases is a result of the free-market of services, or if per-
haps some other factor is influencing the number of nonAFDC
users and those subsequently those provided services at county
Child Support Enforcement agencies.
Descriptive statistics of the total numbers of clients per cat-
egories, AFDC and non-AFDC, are displayed in a graph (see
figure 1). It becomes obvious that prior to 1985 the number
of non-AFDC clients were minimal. For the year 1985 there is
a significant increase in clients served for both groups, most
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likely to increased enforcement capabilities, Federal subsidy of
the program, and incentive payments. Visually, it becomes quite
obvious that as the number of AFDC cases rises, so does the
number of non-AFDC cases. To determine if this relationship
has a statistical relationship, ratios were calculated for all years
and all counties, that is, AFDC/non-AFDC (RATIO10) and non-
AFDC/AFDC (RATIO01).
According to the data, the maximum ratio for AFDC clients
to non-AFDC clients for any county was 191.5 to 1 in 1984 and
the minimum ratio was .2655 in 1990. However, as one can read-
ily see from Table 2, mean ratios tended towards 1 (1.649, 1.424,
1.294, 1.214) beginning in 1987 with corresponding decreasing
standard deviations. Therefore by 1987, the ratio between AFDC
cases and non-AFDC has stabilized as can be seen from a plot
of the ratios (see Figure 2).
There were eight counties (or 12 percent), which have larger
or more equitable distributions between AFDC clients and non-
AFDC clients. T-tests done on the RATIO variables confirm that
statistically, at the. 05 level, the RATIO10 ratios for 1988, 1989,
and 1990 are the same.
To determine if coding, that is, AFDC and non-AFDC, is a
function of year, which may be influenced by such factors as the
economy, a log-linear model, contingency table procedure (SPSS
1986) was used to select the model for fitting multidimensional
Table 2
AFDC to non-AFDC Ratios for 1984-1990, State of Alabama
Year Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
1984 .9167 191.500 20.003 30.146
1985 .5865 23.969 4.296 3.246
1986 .4135 6.282 2.173 1.422
1987 .3623 5.111 1.649 1.026
1988 .3029 5.205 1.424 .931
1989 .2903 6.150 1.294 .884
1990 .2655 4.410 1.214 .775
F+ + .- #in-
0 0
CU 0.
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tables. The hypothesis tested was whether code and or year
had an influence on the number of cases and if code and year
(interaction) had an effect on the count, and whether these two
were independent of each other. Using the design = Year*code
weighted by the actual number of cases for each category of
client tested for year and code and year/code interaction (num-
ber of cases=year + code + year*code). The null hypothesis
is that year and code are independent. This goodness of fit
procedure is described by Bishop, Fienberg, Holland, Light &
Mosteller (1975) and is used to obtain summary statistics for
discrete, dichotomous variables.
For this analysis, data were coded 1 for those agency clients
on welfare (AFDC) and 2 for those who were non-public as-
sistance clients. The goal was to determine if some cells differ
from the general pattern of the others. Both factors, year and
code had a significant effect on the number of cases, and the
factors were dependent (p.<.01), indicating that code depends
on year as measured by the number of cases.
The question becomes one of determining what accounts
for the variability in the data. To determine if year has an
effect on the ratio of cases, Proportional Analysis for General
Linear Models (SAS, 1985) was employed. When all years were
included in the procedure, where the dependent variable was
RATIO10, the R2 =.2381 (p<.0001). When the dependent variable
ratio was RATIO01 the R2=.3439 (p<.0001). Therefore the ratio,
non-AFDC/AFDC accounts for more of the variance. Year by
year proportional analysis yields significant R2s, but the highest
is R2=.3021 for 1984 for the ratio AFDC/non-AFDC. Therefore
year accounts for a maximum of 30 percent of the variability
due to the ratio of the cases.
A Pearson's correlation analysis and regression analyses
suggest that the number of cases in one category, i.e., AFDC or
non-AFDC is highly associated with the other. A Pearson corre-
lational analysis for all years, where AFDC cases are correlated
with non-AFDC cases, yields correlations ranging from r=.841
for all years together and from r=.51 for 1984 to correlations
greater than r=.93 for 1985-1990, with the exception of 1986.
Therefore the number of AFDC cases is highly correlated with
non-AFDC cases.
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When a regression model is employed to see if the number
of AFDC clients can be predicted from the number of non-AFDC
using all years in the analysis, the R2 was only. 0007. However,
year by year analysis yields significant R2s for 1985 (R2=.8827,
p<.04); 1986 (R2=. 7816, P<.0571). For the years 1987 and 1988,
the analysis produces an R2=.9192 and R2=.9226, but neither
are significant at the. 05 level. For 1989 the R2 had dropped to
R2=.8975 but it was significant at the. 03 level. Therefore as one
goes up so does the other. While this can be easily seen in a raw
numbers graph (see figure 1), statistically analysis supports this
assertion of relatedness between the two categories of clients;
the number of non-AFDC cases depends on the number of
AFDC cases. 2
Discussion and Policy Implications
If the number of non-welfare clients depends on the number
of welfare clients, the question remains why. While the data
and analysis indicate a statistical relationship between the two
caseload types, these data cannot provide the answer as to why
the two caseload categories are related. The incentive structure,
whereby the agency is limited to 115 percent of incentive pay-
ment of collections from welfare clients, may have an affect on
case loads; that is, agencies may be adjusting service delivery
to nonAFDC clients based on the amount of average collections
from AFDC clients. As demonstrated earlier, agencies in Al-
abama do not appear to be having difficulty with non-AFDC
collections, where collections have exceed AFDC collections
since 1986 (see Table 1).
If the agency is not provided an incentive for collecting for
the non-AFDC client after a certain level, then it seems wise
economic sense not to expend staff hours to take on new non-
AFDC clients. A General Accounting Office (GAO, 1987) CSE
program assessment drew similar conclusions regarding agency
performance with respect to the AFDC component. Forty-two
percent of the sample of programs in the assessment appeared
to be providing inadequate service, primarily due to poor case
management practices. The GAO concluded that financial ob-
jectives contribute to inadequate case handling (p.20). Similarly,
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the GAO believes the incentive formula may encourage states
to continue favoring cases with high collection potential (p. 44).
This assessment, however was for AFDC cases only. What hap-
pens with the non-AFDC component is undetermined. How-
ever, if collections for non-AFDC are relatively more efficient,
and the data from Alabama support this, their pursual may be
hampered by the non-AFDC incentive formula which is AFDC
collections dependent.
The role of advertising may be a significant factor in how
agencies control case loads. If the services of the agency are
not advertised in places where a variety of potential clients are
likely to see them, or if advertising is not on a fixed schedule,
advertising could control case loads. If the goal is to optimize
collection from responsible parents, then marketing services
could play a key role. Where and how often OCSE services
are advertised can be important. Targeting different audiences
may require different strategies. Aversion to use of "welfare-
type" services, if CSE agencies are housed within departments
of human resources, may also be a factor.
The dependence of non-AFDC client loads on AFDC client
loads has other implications as well. Besides inequitable service
to non-welfare clients, the non-welfare, absent parent, is not
being sought out with the enforcement capabilities of the CSE
agencies. In the case of welfare clients, who are mandated to
participate in the CSE program, the absent parent is most likely
black (see Sweet and Bumpass 1987, p. 240). If the majority
of women who have child support orders or agreements to
pay, but do not receive support are white (66 percent according
to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
1989, p. 14), then white males, assuming white females are
married to white males, are given "indirect" preferential treat-
ment by state agencies. In effect, black absent parents are being
discriminated against because their families are disproportion-
ately on welfare. Therefore, if the incentive structure is a key
factor, the Federal OCSE is instrumental in legitimating social
inequality. Families which are not in poverty, and which do
not receive support from absent fathers, are also effectively
being discriminated against because their case numbers ate
being "controlled" at the agency level, caseload numbers which
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according to this analysis, are dependent on the number of
AFDC cases.
Proposals
The following proposals are offered as changes which could
be made in the structure of the CSE program, changes which
could promote serving non-welfare clients and changes which
would not necessarily discourage serving AFDC clients.
1. The incentive structure will continue to be a problem, but
incentives for non-AFDC collections could be raised to
120 percent of AFDC collections to see if agencies respond
accordingly. The $25 maximum fee charge for non-AFDC
clients could be changed to a sliding scale fee to help
cover the costs of extra staff needed to handle non-AFDC
cases.
2. in addition to incentives, agencies could be provided
monetary recognition bonuses for outstanding collections
on behalf of non-AFDC clients. The bonuses could be
awarded quarterly, or could be used to provide for an
additional staff member's salary.
3. The Office of Child Support Enforcements (OCSE) should
ensure compliance with staffing requirements as specified
by federal law and regulation (General Accounting Office
1987,p. 46) so that insufficient staff cannot be cited as
justification for lack of services to non-welfare clients.
4. Advertising and marketing guidelines of CSE services
need to be developed and monitored by the OCSE to
assure that a variety of audiences are targeted on a fixed
rather than an arbitrary schedule. Monitoring of client
profiles would help to determine if agencies had broad-
ened their target clients beyond low income populations.
All public state and federal offices as well as private busi-
nesses could be targeted. Targeting places of employment
is especially relevant as more employers are required
to withhold child support payments from employees'
checks.
5. Privitization of services to non-welfare clients could be
an alternative. An agency not connected with human
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services may appeal to some clients who have avoided
investigation because of the association with welfare.
However, as private agencies operate on a profit margin
formula, an alternative for the incentive formula will
have to be developed.
Conclusion
The federal incentive structure may be a key factor in af-
fecting both AFDC (GAO 1987) and non-AFDC case loads and
handling. The incentive structure may be instrumental in in-
fluencing the "willingness" of agencies to serve non-welfare
clients because of financial objectives aimed at maximizing the
incentive received from the federal government. The incentive
formula clearly favors the pursual of AFDC collections. This
is of special concern,, not only because too many children are
living in poverty, but because non-collection of child support
is a pervasive social problem and affects not only the poor, but
the non-poor as well.
As more well-to-do and celebrity child support cases reach
the media, it should serve to stimulate interest in the child
support issue. Stories about dead-beat-dad raids in the middle
of night are dramatic, but they make the point that non-payment
of child support is a social problem for all of society, not just
a problem for people on welfare.
More needs to be done to assure that those who are not
receiving support, or enough support, know about the services
of the CSEL and that they are served once they get there.
Guidelines for advertising need to be not only developed but
monitored. The federal role appears to be very important in
influencing what happens at the agency level. As a nation, we
need to support the family, all families. We need to recognize
that non-payment of child support is not just a welfare issue.
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Notes
1. The GAO (1987) program assessment of states' CSE programs, specifically
the AFDC component, recommends that the data obtained from these
agencies can be unreliable, therefore, caution must be used in interpreting
any analysis based on them.
2. Interpretation from the data need to be viewed with caution, as suggested
by the GAO study of 1987. However, the extremely high R2s and rs indicate
that "something is going on." Whether this is artifact of agency recording or
the result of agency case management strategy, neither situation is "good."
